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Minimum Standards, Fixed Costs and Taxing 





The paper examines the question how fiscally strong and fiscally weak states respond to 
taxing autonomy at the state level, a subject that is currently under debate in Germany where 
states do have virtually no power to tax. We use a simple theoretical model that incorporates 
state surtaxes on the federal income tax bill taking into account fixed costs as well as 
minimum standards for the provision of public services. We show that both factors work in 
the direction of forcing fiscally weak states to collect higher surtaxes as compared to fiscally 
strong states. The empirical section presents evidence on the importance of fixed costs at the 
state level and calculates the distributional effects of taxing autonomy taking feedbacks of the 
fiscal equalization system into account. In addition simple estimates of the importance of 
spending on minimum standards are derived. 
JEL Code: H11, H50, H71. 
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In Germany state governments virtually do not have any power to tax. Most of tax revenues come out 
of shared tax resources with tax rates fixed by the federal government and with one exception only 
even tax rates of taxes that are earmarked to the state level are regulated by federal law. This lack of 
taxing autonomy is a constant source of dispute in politics as well as in the academic discussion in 
Germany, see Baretti et al. (2000) for a detailed presentation. In 2002 Germany started a broad 
discussion on reforming the fiscal federalism system. However, the first reform period was stopped by 
the federal election campaign in 2005 and produced only modest reforms. After the 2005 federal 
elections a second reform process was initiated in which the subject of federal-state fiscal relations is 
on the top of the policy agenda. The topics of most importance in the current reform process are deficit 
control mechanisms at the state and federal government level, a reform of the division of tasks 
between the central and the subnational government sector and the issue of granting more taxing 
autonomy to the states.
1 Thus a piggybacking system is proposed in which states should have the right 
to collect a surtax on federal income taxes and to restrict this surtax to some band limits, such as +/-
10% of federal income tax payments.
2 The latter issue is the subject of the present paper. 
 
The taxing autonomy issue at the state level is dominated by two quite extreme positions. On the one 
hand, politicians especially from fiscally strong states, argue that introducing taxing autonomy at the 
state level helps to improve fiscal discipline, strengthens the accountability and transparency of 
responsibilities and supports the international competitiveness of the German economy. On the other 
hand, policy makers from fiscally weaker states as well as academics that fear a race to the bottom
3 of 
surtaxes in the tax competition process are against state taxing autonomy. Public opinion also matters. 
A recent survey by the Bertelsmann Stiftung, see Bertelsmann Stiftung (2008), which is a private non-
party operating foundation, examined the opinion of citizens in Germany on federal institutions and 
reforms in federalism in Germany. According to the survey results more than 80% of respondents 
indicated that they did not want differences in tax rates across the German states. This result was 
independent of political preferences of citizens as well as whether citizens live in fiscally strong or 
fiscally weak states. The survey results also suggested that citizens are quite critical with respect to 




                                                 
1 See Jourmard and Kongsrud (2003) for a general discussion of subnational government taxing autonomy as 
well as information on the handling of this issue in various countries. 
2 As is common in the Nordic countries. 
3 See for example OECD (1998). 
4 However, the survey results indicated that citizens want to have more autonomy for local governments. Thus 
citizens make a clear distinction between the local, state and federal government level. The present paper addresses the issue of the effects of taxing autonomy on fiscally strong and fiscally 
weak states, an issue that is not that systematically addressed in the literature, see however Fuest 
(2008) for a recent contribution. The tax competition literature addressing asymmetries between 
jurisdictions almost exclusively in terms of size differences, see for example Hoyt (1992). Before we 
turn to our theoretical model section 2 provides a short description of some important peculiarities of 
fiscal federalism in Germany that are worth knowing in order to understand our modeling strategy as 
well as our empirical analysis. Section 3 presents a simple theoretical model that incorporates features 
that are of crucial importance in the German discussion on taxing autonomy. Our model takes into 
account the fiscal equalization system that brings about an equalization of revenues across states with 
above and below average fiscal capacity. In addition, we incorporate minimum standards for the 
provision of public services which will turn out to be of quite significant importance. Finally, we 
model fixed cost at the state level. These fixed costs are not interpreted as fixed costs of running a 
state - such as the administrative infrastructure - but in terms of the fiscal burden due to political 
decisions made in the past. In Germany, in fiscally weak states per capita interest payments as well as 
per capita spending for retired public servants is higher as compared to fiscally strong states. Thus 
fiscally weak states fear that they would be forced to enter an "unfair" competition if taxing autonomy 
is introduced because they have a below average tax base, a far above average inherited fiscal burden 
and are forced to provide a high standard of minimum public services provision. Therefore it is feared 
that taxing autonomy might contribute to an increase in fiscal disparities across states.
5 We use our 
model to evaluate these arguments and also present some simulation experiments which show, that the 
seriousness of these arguments critically depend upon the importance of minimum standards. Section 
4 reports empirical evidence on the main ingredients of our theoretical model. We examine the 
distributional impact of introducing taxing autonomy at the state level taking the fiscal equalization 
system into account. In addition, we report evidence on the importance of fixed cost and minimum 
standard spending at the state level. However, both our theoretical work in section 3 as well as our 
empirical investigation in section 4 disregards the potential feedback effects that might result from the 
long-run effects induced by state tax competition on the distribution of the population and income 
across states. Thus, we either implicitly assume that the impact of income tax competition on 
interregional migration flows of households is rather small or our theoretical model and our empirical 
results hold for the short-run or medium run only.   
 
Whereas the issues discussed in this paper are of not that much importance for federal systems with a 
well developed taxing autonomy of subnational government, such as the U.S., Switzerland or Canada, 
the subject should be of interest in federal countries with a taxation system similar to Germany and 
especially economies in Eastern Europe or in developing countries that are in the process of creating 
federalist structures.  
                                                 
5 Prud´homme (1995) provides an extensive discussion on the impact of subnational government autonomy on 
fiscal and economic disparities.  
2. Fiscal Federalism in Germany in a nutshell 
 
In Germany there are 16 states (Länder), three of which are in fact large cities (Berlin, Hamburg and 
Bremen) and are called "city states". The other thirteen states are called "area states" and each area 
state consists of numerous cities, towns and villages. Five of the area states have been formed in 1990 
out of the collapsed GDR (East German states). The city state Berlin is a mixture of the former West 
Berlin and East Berlin. Berlin as well as the East German states receive significant federal grants for 
the reconstruction of the infrastructure that will terminate in 2019.    
 
The discussion in Germany on fiscal federalism cannot be understood without taking a look at the 
German Constitution. The German Constitution, the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, 
asks for the achievement of "equal living conditions" throughout the country in Article 72, sect. 2: 
 
"The Federation shall have the right to legislate … if and to the extent that the 
establishment of equal living conditions throughout the federal territory or the 
maintenance of legal or economic unity renders federal regulation necessary in the 
national interest." 
 
Political discussions that have regional distributional effects are always influenced by referring to the 
Constitutional command to achieve "equal living conditions". Neither the Constitution nor policy 
makers or academics can provide a precise definition of what "equal living conditions" really means. 
However, the simple reference to this Constitutional restriction makes it hard for politicians to 
implement programs or reforms which are expected to increase regional disparities.  
 
Tax revenues in Germany are collected from two types of taxes. The majority of taxes are ´joint taxes´ 
i. e. the revenue out of these taxes are shared between the federal, state and the local government 
sector. The revenues are distributed vertically according to negotiated shares, some of which are fixed 
in the Constitution. About 75% of all tax revenues belong to this category. Only 25% of tax revenues 
are derived from taxes earmarked to one level of government only. Currently, the German states
6 do 
have virtually no power to set tax rates despite the fact that about 73% of the states´ total revenues 
come out of taxes. Tax rates are set by the federal government. However, if tax rates of joint taxes or 
tax rates of taxes that are earmarked to the states are changed, states participate in the legislation 
process through voting in the Upper Chamber (Bundesrat). Thus, the states can jointly influence tax 
policy but none of the states can fix tax rates individually.  
 
                                                 
6 Contrary to the states, the local governments can decide - more or less independently - on the tax rates of local 
property taxes (Grundsteuer) and the local business tax (Gewerbesteuer). Table 1 reports some key data on the distribution of tax revenues in Germany across the three layers 
of government. About 87% of state tax revenues come out of joint taxes with tax rates fixed 
nationwide by the federal government. With one exception only, tax rates of taxes earmarked to the 
state level are also beyond the control of individual states. Since 2006 states have the right to fix the 
rate of the real property transfer tax (Grunderwerbssteuer) the revenues of which amounts to only 
about 3.5% of total state tax revenues.
7 This complete lack of the power to tax of German states is 
frequently discussed in Germany and the central topic of this paper.
8  
 
Table 1:  Distribution of tax revenues in Germany among federal, state and local governments 
(institutional setting and revenue data from 2006). 
 
 Federal  States  local 
governments 
total revenue 
2006 in bill. ε 
1) 
1. Value added tax 
2. Income tax incl. wage tax 
3. Non-assessed taxes on Earnings 
4. Interest income deduction 





















A. joint taxes (1.-5.) in bill. €  162.8 148,5 18,0 329.3
B. Taxes earmarked to one level of 
government in bill. € 
84,2 21,7 49,3 155.2
C. Total tax revenues in bill. €  247,0 170,2 67,3 484.5
Source: Federal Ministry of Finance, Berlin, Germany. 
 
Apart from the high share of shared tax resources a second important characteristic of the fiscal 
federalism system in Germany is a rather pronounced horizontal fiscal equalization system that 
redistributes state tax revenues across states. As mentioned above, joint taxes are distributed vertically 
between the three layers of government. State tax revenue resulting out of joint taxes - with the 
exception of the VAT - are distributed across the individual states according to the tax revenues 
collected in each state. Revenues of taxes that accrue to the state level only are also assigned to the 
state where these tax revenues are collected. The distribution of states´ revenue share of VAT is 
described below. 
 
Because the fiscal equalization system is very complicated and the details are not of that much 
importance for our subsequent discussion, we restrict our attention to the distributional effects of this 
system. Table 2 reports data on tax revenues and the effects of the fiscal equalization system in the 
fiscal year 2007. Because tax revenues of local governments are taken into account in the fiscal 
equalization system, we also report tax revenues at the local government level as well as at the 
aggregate of the state and local government level in each states. We sorted states into three groups 
(eight West German area states, five East German area states and three city states) and each group has 
                                                 
7 It is interesting to note that up to the present out of the 16 states only the state Berlin has used this power to 
change (increase) this tax rate. 
8 In passing we note that despite the lack of taxing power states are responsible for tax collection and tax 
administration. been sorted in order of increasing fiscal capacity at the state and local government level. Column (1) 
reports the population in 2007 in mill., and we see that states differ dramatically with respect to 
population size, ranging from about 0.7 mill. inhabitants in the city state Bremen to about 18 mill. 
inhabitants in Nordrhein-Westfalen. Column (2a) shows state per capita tax revenues out of earmarked 
and joint tax resources - excluding VAT - and in column (2b) we express these figures in % of the 
national average. As we can see, the East German states have a fiscal capacity that is less than 50% of 
the national average. In West Germany the relation ranges from about 80% (Saarland) to about 170% 
(Hamburg) of average per capita state tax revenues. In column (3a) we add revenues out of the VAT 
which are distributed in a first step according to the number of inhabitants in each state. This brings 
about a significant equalizing effect, see column (3b), especially in the East German states. Because in 
the fiscal equalization system local government tax revenues are included, column (4a) reports per 
capita local government tax revenues.
9 Here too, see column (4b), we observe dramatic interregional 
disparities in tax revenues that coincide with disparities at the state level. Column (5) reports total per 
capita redistribution transfers in the fiscal equalization system. Redistribution occurs in two steps, 
which are not documented separately. In a first step VAT revenues are redistributed in favor of fiscally 
weak states which has a very strong equalizing effect. In a second step a further equalization of tax 
revenues including VAT is calculated. A minus entry in column (5) means that the state has to make 
transfer payments whereas a plus entry indicates a recipient state. In the East German states transfers 
received amount to more than 50% of own tax revenues as reported in column (3a). Column (6a) adds 
total state tax revenues and transfers. As we can see a rather "perverse" effect occurs at the state level 
because the very poor East German states have above average revenues at the state level after 
euqalization, see column (6b).
10 The reason
11 for this is the inclusion of local government tax revenues 
in the fiscal equalization system. Therefore we report total aggregate revenue at the state and local 
government sector in column (7a). Here we observe, see column (7b), that per capita revenue in East 
Germany is about 10% below the average.
12 In West Germany, the poorest state (Niedersachsen) has 
about 93% of average per capita revenue whereas Hamburg, which is the richest state, has about 141% 
of the average per capita revenue. 
 
                                                 
9 In the fiscal equalization system only 64% of local tax revenues are taken into account. In table 2 we report 
total local government revenues. 
10 Another "perverse" effects occurs for city states. The reason for this is the fact, that in the fiscal equalization 
system the number of inhabitants of city states is artificially increased by 35% because it is argued that 
agglomerations have higher fiscal needs, an issue that is almost permanently under dispute in Germany. 
11 However, one has to take into account that because of the poor fiscal capacity of the local government sector 
in East Germany, see column (4b), East German states have to provide far above average unconditional grants to 
local governments, which exceed the West German average value by about 100%! Thus "disposable tax 
revenue" of East German states - state tax revenues including fiscal equalization transfers net of transfers to the 
local government sector - are lower as compared to West German states. 
12 Our presentation of the fiscal equalization system does not include another equalizing step, namely additional 




State tax revenues 
without VAT 
State tax revenues 
including VAT 




Total state tax revenue 
after redistribution 
State and local gov. tax 
revenues after 
redistribution 
  West German area states 
  (1)  (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b)  (4a)  (4b) (5)  (6a)  (6b)  (7a)  (7b) 
Hessen  6,1 2.036  145,1% 2.936 127,5% 1.163 128,3% -644 2.292 99,5% 3.454 107,6% 
Baden-
Württemberg  10,7 1.696  120,8% 2.595 112,7% 1.100 121,4% -359 2.237 97,1% 3.337 104,0% 
Bayern  12,5 1.700  121,1% 2.599 112,8% 1.046 115,5% -336 2.263 98,2% 3.309 103,1% 
Nordrhein-
Westfalen 18,0  1.474  105,0% 2.374 103,1% 955 105,4%  -158 2.216 96,2% 3.171 98,8% 
Schleswig-
Holstein 2,8  1.287  91,7% 2.186 94,9% 876 96,7%  -5 2.181 94,7% 3.057 95,3% 
Rheinland-
Pfalz  4,0 1.294  92,2% 2.194 95,2% 826 91,1%  28 2.222 96,5% 3.048 95,0% 
Saarland  1,0 1.123  80,0% 2.023 87,8% 760 83,9%  225 2.248 97,6% 3.008 93,7% 
Niedersachsen  8,0 1.192  84,9% 2.092 90,8% 799 88,2%  78 2.170 94,2% 2.970 92,5% 
  East German area states 
Sachsen-
Anhalt  2,4 680  48,4% 1.580 68,6% 527 58,2%  776 2.356 102,3% 2.883 89,8% 
Brandenburg  2,5 719  51,2% 1.618 70,2% 512 56,5%  749 2.368 102,8% 2.879 89,7% 
Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern  1,7 579  41,2% 1.478 64,2% 455 50,2%  922 2.400 104,2% 2.855 89,0% 
Sachsen  4,2 632  45,0% 1.531 66,5% 468 51,6%  843 2.375 103,1% 2.842 88,6% 
Thüringen  2,3 593  42,3% 1.493 64,8% 458 50,6%  885 2.378 103,3% 2.837 88,4% 
  city states 
Hamburg  1,8 2.365  168,5% 3.265 141,7% 1.629 179,8% -363 2.902 126,0% 4.531 141,2% 
Bremen  0,7 1.409  100,4% 2.309 100,2% 988 109,0%  553 2.862 124,3% 3.850 120,0% 
Berlin  3,4 1.150  81,9% 2.050 89,0% 723 79,8%  933 2.983 129,5% 3.706 115,5% 
                      
all states  82,3  1.403,8  100,0% 2.303,4 100,0% 906,0 100,0%  0,0 2.303,4 100,0% 3.209,5 100,0% 
Source: Calculations by the author using data supplied by the federal ministry of finance, Berlin, Germany.   8
Without looking detailed at each figure in table 2 one can immediately see that the distributional 
impact of the fiscal equalization system in Germany is very strong, and it should be no surprise that 
this provokes permanent discussions in politics and academics, see Baretti, Huber and Lichtblau 
(2002). If there would be no fiscal equalization system and if VAT would be distributed using the state 
population share, the East German states would have per capita tax revenues at the aggregate state and 
local government level that amount to about 62% of the average value. In West Germany, average per 
capita tax revenues would range from about 87% (Saarland) to about 153% (Hamburg) of the average 
per capita tax revenue. The fiscal equalization system reduces these fiscal disparities across all states 
to the range of 88% to 140% , see column (7b). 
 
As a matter of course, the quite significant equalizing effects are associated with massive transfer 
payments of fiscally strong states and these states make massive political lobby work to reduce the 
transfer burden. Taxing autonomy is one option to reduce the transfer burden because, as we will 
argue in the next section, introducing taxing autonomy requests that all or at least a significant share of 
tax revenues collected from applying surtaxes have to be taken out of the fiscal equalization system. 
Thus the discussion in Germany on the taxing autonomy is closely related to issues of interregional 
fiscal disparities and distribution.  
 
 
3.  A simple theoretical model 
 
Our model rests upon a theoretical framework suggested by Fuest (2008) which we extent by 
incorporating a minimum standard for the provision of public services. As we will show this 
assumption crucially affects the differences of tax rates between states with above and below average 
tax capacity.  
 
The model setup 
 
We assume that the i = 1,.. n German states are allowed to collect a surtax on the federal income tax. 
States differ with respect to the number of inhabitants, mi, and average taxable income, yi, which is 
taxed by a federal tax rate as well as a state surtax, ti.
13 The strong fiscal equalization system in 
Germany that we outlined in the previous section can be modeled in a highly stylized per capita form 
as:  
(1)   ) ( i i r r b z − = . 
                                                 
13 We do not take into account issues of vertical tax competition which are considered for example by Keen and 
Kotsogiannis (2002) or Keen (1998).   9
with r  denoting average per capita tax revenues across all states and ri per capita tax revenues in state 
i. zi are per capita transfers received by states with below-average tax capacity (ri < r → zi > 0) or per 
capita transfer payments if the state has an above average tax capacity  (ri > r → z i < 0). The 
parameter b, 0 < b < 1, determines the intensity of the fiscal equalization system. The larger b, the 
stronger is the equalizing effect. We assume that tax revenues in state i are proportional to average 
income in state i, yi, and we model two types of tax revenues. The first type are income tax revenues 
and the second type are all other tax revenues, the tax rates of which are fixed by federal law and 
cannot be manipulated by states.  
 
As set out in section 2, currently the income tax is shared between the federal, local and state 
government level and 42.5% of the income taxes collected within states accrue to the state level. Thus 
the implicit state income rate is currently given by 0.425τ  where τ  is the federal income tax rate 
which is identical across all states. Because the introduction of tax autonomy is not designed to 
increase the general income tax rate the federal tax rate would have to be reduced as for example by 
the average surtax expected to be collected by states.
14 In addition, an introduction of tax autonomy in 
federal systems with fiscal equalization is only meaningful if tax revenues collected out of the surtax 
are not fully taken into account in the fiscal equalization system
15 and the outcome of the fiscal 
equalization system is not affected by differences in state surtaxes. Thus total income tax revenues of 
state i are given by (s+ti)yi, where s denotes the income tax rate due to federal tax laws after 
introducing taxing autonomy (s < 0.425τ ) and ti the surtax in state i. In the fiscal equalization system 
only the federal income tax revenues syi are taken into account and thus we can rewrite the fiscal 
equalization system in per capita form as: 
(1´)   ) )( (
d
i i t s y y b z + − =  
where t
d denotes the tax rate (fixed by federal tax laws) on all other taxes and  y is the average income 
across all states, which could also be set equal to zero without loss of generality. Note, that tax 
revenues collected from applying state surtaxes are not taken into account in the fiscal equalization 
system (1´). Thus there is no direct impact of state differences in surtaxes on the fiscal equalization 
system. However, indirect effects would arise if differences in state tax surcharges induce migration 
and thus affect both yi and mi. 
 
Total per capita state revenues are given by 
(2)   i i
d
i i z t t s y r + + + = ) (.  
                                                 
14 In addition, the revenue share of states has to be adjusted. 
15 Keen (1998) stresses the role of fiscal equalization systems as an instrument to internalize fiscal externalities 
within a federal system. This role as matter of course also depends upon the extent to which tax revenues 
collected by states by surtaxes are included in the fiscal equalization system.   10
One should expect that in the case of tax autonomy s is fixed such that s ≤ 0.425τ. Thus the effective 
state income tax rate s + ti can be both smaller as well as larger as s because it might be possible that 
some states set ti < 0. In addition, we take s as an indicator of the intensity of tax autonomy. If states 
are granted the right to collect a surtax on the federal income tax rate and the surtax is restricted to the 
range say +/- 20% as compared to a range of say +/- 10%, in the former case a smaller share of income 
tax revenues of states would be included in the fiscal equalization system. In an extreme version - 
which is also discussed in Germany - all income taxes accrue to the state level and states fix income 
tax rates autonomously and s could be set equal to zero. In this case income tax revenues are 
completely disregarded in the fiscal equalization system. Alternatively one can set s equal to some 
fictious value in the range 0 < s < 0.425τ.
16 The crucial point is, that the parameter s is independent of 
ti and thus income tax revenues of state i included in the fiscal equalization system are not affected by 
state's i income tax policy. Because in our subsequent model it is not possible to compare the current 
situation - no taxing authority of states - with the reform model - the power to tax income - we use the 
parameter s to evaluate the impact of varying degrees of tax autonomy on fiscal outcomes.
17  
 
We model two types of expenditures. The first type are program expenditures which we denote - in per 
capita terms - by gi. In addition we introduce a fixed cost component, ai, for which we offer two 
interpretations. ai can be interpreted as the fixed cost of running states - such as the cost of the general 
administration infrastructure
18 - or alternatively, ai can be interpreted as cost inherited from past 
decisions, such as interest payments on state public debt and pension payments on retired public 
servants. Thus total expenditures in state i are simply defined by ai + migi. As we will show in our 
empirical part both interest and pension payments are quite important and per capita spending in 
fiscally weak states is significantly higher as compared to fiscally stronger states.  
 
Private households have the simple budget restriction: 
(3)   ci = (1 - s - ti)yi.  







i i c g g W
− − =
1 ) (     1  <  ß < 1. 
subject to the budget restriction 
(5)   ai + migi = mi(s+ti)yi + mizi  
which is given in per capita terms as: 
(5´)   ai/mi +gi = (s+ti)yi +zi . 
                                                 
16 In the latter case it might occur that income tax revenues of state i taken into account in the fiscal equalization 
system exceed effective income tax revenues if state i has a very low income tax rate such that s + ti < s. 
17 In an early paper, Musgrave (1961) addressed the issue of fiscal equalization and state tax autonomy. 
18 This interpretation would coincide with issues discussed by Tullock (1969). 
19 Fuest (2008) uses the welfare function Wi = h(gi) + u(ci).   11
 
Note that our welfare function is of the Stone-Geary type
20 and incorporates a minimum standard of 
per capita public good provision,  g . The welfare function (4) should not be looked upon as the utility 
function of households because households also derive utility from public service provision gi <  g . 
Equation (4) is interpreted by us as the welfare function policy makers have in mind and we argue that 
in the political competition process policy makers only gain a competitive advantage if public service 
provision exceeds the amount  g . Alternatively one could incorporate gi  rather than (gi -  g ) in the 
welfare function and specify an additional restriction gi >  g to take minimum standards into account. 
Our specification is a simplified version which facilitates the derivation of simple closed-form 
solutions. 
 
The public good gi has the property of a publicly provided private good and for the sake of simplicity 
we call the expenditures gi primary expenditures. We believe that the specification of a minimum 
standard in public good provision is both a meaningful as well as realistic assumption especially in 
Germany because the German Constitution asks for the achievement of "equal living condition" as has 
been discussed in section 2. Even if one disregards this special Constitutional condition in Germany, 
one should expect that in virtually all areas of policy states have to meet a minimum standard of public 
good provision. State government cannot freely adjust the provision of public services because 
political factors as well as social norms in the society ask for certain standards in schools, the tax 
administration, police forces, courts, etc. In addition, regulations by federal law as well as by EU laws 
significantly affect state policy ranging from environmental protection policy up to the support of 
schooling and cultural activities of minorities.
21 Taking minimum standards in account total public 
expenditures at the state level can be written as: 
(6)   state expenditures = ai + mig +mi(gi - g)    g i ≥  g . 
The first two expenditure components are virtually beyond the control of state government, at least in 
the short-run and medium-run. Pension payments for retired public servants can be manipulated only 
within a time horizon of more than 20 years and it also takes a considerable time to reduce state debt 
and thus achieve significant savings in interest expenditures.
22  
                                                 
 




i i i c g g x A W
− − =
1 ) )( ( with A(..) 
denoting an amenity factor and the vector xi includes a wide range of state specific and utility creating 
characteristics (such as the landscape, cultural ties etc.) because without these additional factors the currently 
observed distribution of the population across states would not be consistent with an equilibrium. However, 
because we do not take into account migration flows we disregard the issue of the equilibrium distribution of the 
population and thus can stick to our simple specification. 
21 Using a data set of program specific expenditures we estimated that about 20% of state primary expenditures 
are directly determined by EU programs and federal standards, see Seitz (2008b). 
22 Recent reforms in Germany tried to reduce the impact of federal standards on state expenditures but taking the 
constitutional constraints of achieving "equal living conditions" into account, these reforms have been rather 




Making the usual Cournot assumption, that means, states do not take into account fiscal externalities 
induced by own actions on other states, we derive the following optimality condition by maximizing 
(4) subject to (3) and (5´): 
(7)   0
) 1 (





























The effect dgi/dti is derived from the government budget restriction (5´) and is given by: 



























with ηm,g > 0 bzw. ηm,t < 0 denoting the elasticity of the population with respect to the provision of 
public services and the state surtax. To ensure dgi/dti > 0 we need stability conditions similar to those 
derived by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986). A positive denominator requests │timiyi │>│ aiηm,t │and 
a positive nominator we get under the assumption gimi > aiηm,g. Both conditions are met if we assume 
that fixed costs ai are not unreasonable high and both elasticities do not take on implausible high 
(absolute) values. 
 
Empirical research suggests, see Kirchgässner and Pommerehne (1996), Feld and Kirchgässner 
(2001), or Feld (2000), Liebig and Sousa-Poza (2006) or Liebig, Puhani and Sousa-Poza (2007), that 
the impact of tax competition on interregional migration flows of households is rather small. Feld and 
Frey (2000) even argue, that the marginal impact of differences in personal income taxes between the 
Swiss cantons on interregional migration flows of households makes it possible to run redistributive 
politics at the subnational government level. If we take a closer look at equation (7) we see that the 
terms dmi/(dtimi)
23 and dmi/(dgimi) are the relative change in the size of the population induced by a 
marginal increase in ti and gi and one should expect that both effects are rather small numerically. In 
addition, both effects are counter directed and thus there are neutralizing forces at work. Therefore we 
follow the assumption of Fuest (2008) and neglect the impact of tax competition between states on the 
distribution of households as well as on income across states, an assumption that should hold at least 
in the short-run and medium-run.  
 
Under these simplifying assumption we get a very simply equation for state surtaxes: 
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23 We use semi-elasticities because using elasticities would make it necessary to expand the equation with ti and 
we would receive a nonlinear equation in ti!   13
The state surtax ti can be both positive as well as negative and we can derive the following properties: 
a)  dti/d g  = (1-ß)/yi > 0, that is, an increase in minimum standards puts an upward pressure on 
state surtaxes. 
b)  dti/dsi < 0, that is, an increase in the federal tax rate reduces the state surtax. As we discussed 
above, we take s as an indicator of the degree of taxing autonomy of states arguing that an increase in 
taxing autonomy drives down s and thus more taxing autonomy leads to an increase in the surtax. 
c)  The impact of the fiscal equalization parameter b, which determines the intensity of the 
revenue equalizing effect of the equalization system, depends upon the fiscal capacity of state i. For 
fiscally weak states, yi <  y , dti/db is negative whereas the effect is positive for fiscally strong states.  
d)  An increase in ai is positive and stronger for fiscally weaker states (yi <  y )
24 as well as for 




























However, our theoretical model does not make it possible to derive general conclusions with respect to 
the question, whether fiscally strong or weak states set higher surtaxes. To examine the issue further 
we derive the surtax differential between a fiscally weak and fiscally strong state. To achieve this, we 
assume that both states are of equal size m. For fiscally weak state we approximate income by yu = 
y( 1 - λ) and fixed cost by au = a(1+λ) whereas for the fiscally strong state we assume yh =  y (1+λ) and 
ah = a(1-λ). The index u indicates a fiscally weak state whereas the index h indicates a fiscally strong 
state. The parameter λ, 0 < λ < 1, measures the relative difference in income between both states and 
the larger the parameter λ the larger are the differences between the fiscal capacities of both states. As 
we will show in the empirical part of the paper, in Germany fiscally weak states have a significantly 
larger per capita fiscal burden in terms of per capita interest payments as well as per capita spending 
on pension payments for retired public servants as compared to fiscally strong states. This empirical 
fact justifies our assumption au > ah. 
 
Using these assumptions as well as the assumption of equally sized states, m = mu = mh, we get the 
following expression for the surtax difference between both states:  
                                                 
24 Assuming fiscally strong and weak states to be of equal size. 
25 Assuming big and small states to have identical fiscal capacities. 
26 In passing we note that the last effects indicates an impact of demographics - measured in terms of population 
size - on state surtaxes. This is of significant importance in Germany because the states in East Germany are 
forecasted to lose more 10% of their population in the next 25 years. Thus, demographic change puts an upward 
pressure on state surtaxes in East Germany. Because the fiscal capacity of all East German states is significantly 
smaller than the fiscal capacity of the fiscally weakest states in West Germany, this result is of quite significance 
in the discussion on taxing autonomy for states in Germany.   14
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If there would be no fiscal equalization system (b = 0) fiscally weak states would have to charge a 
higher surtax. If there is a fiscal equalization system the difference between the two surtaxes depends 
upon the degree of fiscal equalization (parameter b) as well as the share of tax revenues included in the 
fiscal equalization system (s+t
d). An increase in b or s+t
d  increases the probability that fiscally strong 
states have higher surtaxes as compared to fiscally weak states. On the other hand, increasing values of 
g  as well as per capita fixed cost work in the opposite direction.  
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 in equation (10) using average data for the 
fiscal year 2007. In 2007 the volume of taxes included in the fiscal equalization system amounted to 
about 10% of GDP, which we take as a proxy for s+t
d. The parameter b in the German fiscal 
equalization system is rather high, see Baretti, Huber and Lichtblau (2002) as well as our presentation 
in section 2, and has been set to 0.9. Average state per capita expenditures amounted to about 3,200 €. 
To estimate per capita fixed cost we add average per capita spending on pensions for retired public 
servants (230 €) and interest rate payments (270 €). Average per capita GDP amounted to about 
29,950 € and we assume that 75%
27 of primary expenditures - total per capita expenditures minus per 
capita fixed costs - are determined by minimum standards. Thus  y g /  is about 0.072 and 
) /( 2 y m a about 0,033. Using these benchmark values we evaluate the term in brackets to be about 
+0.011 in which case fiscally weak states have a higher surtax as compared to fiscally strong states. In 
our estimate the critical assumption is the percentage of primary expenditures predermined by 
minimum standards. Therefore we checked the critical value of  g  that produces an estimate of 0 for 
the bracket term. This critical value is reached if about 65% of public primary expenditures are 
determined by minimum standards.
28 In section 4 we provide evidence that in Germany the importance 
of minimum standard spending is well above this ratio. 
 
In a similar way - using the same assumptions - we look at differences in the provision of public 
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27 In section 4 we derive this figure as a rough estimate! 
28 Because in the fiscal equalization system in Germany also a significant share of tax revenues of the local 
government sector within each state is included, the estimate of s+t
d is upward biased and we therefore 
underestimate the critical level of g .    15
The term in parenthesis is "disposable" revenue after paying for fixed cost and minimum standards and 
thus  gi -   g  denotes the volume of per capita primary spending under the discretion of state 
governments. Using equation (11) we can calculate the difference in public service provision between 
a fiscally weak (gu) and a fiscally strong (gh) state which yields the following equation: 
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As a matter of course it is not surprising that this difference is negative - independently of the impact 
of taxing autonomy - because states with a lower tax base can afford only a lower supply of public 
services. This difference is reduced if b increases or if λ decreases. Because in a taxing autonomy 
regime the term b(s+t
d) has to be smaller as compared to a system without taxing autonomy, the 
difference in public service provision increases if the degree of state tax autonomy increases.  
 
 
Results of model simulations  
 
To complement our theoretical analysis we did some simulations to study the impact of the two key 
elements of our theoretical model, fixed cost and minimum standards. Our simulation considers two 
states which differ only with respect to the average income. For the fiscally weak state we assume yu = 
8.000 whereas for the fiscally strong states yh = 12.000. The other parameters are fixed as follows: 
ß = 0.2   t
d = 0.05   s = 0.15   b = 0.9   mu = mh = 100   au = ah = 10,000     y = 10,000 
In a first simulation model we examine the sensitivity of state surtaxes on alternative assumptions 
about minimum standards. This we achieve by steadily increasing g in both states and thus we assume 
that an increasing share of primary expenditures, which we measure in terms of gi, are predermined by 
minimum standards.  
 
The results of our simulations are depicted in figure 1. If there are no minimum standards, the fiscally 
weak state collects a smaller surtax as compared to the fiscally strong state, a result that is consistent 
with Fuest (2008), who does not take minimum standards into account. However, with an increasing 
importance of minimum standards the surtax of the fiscally weak state increases faster than the surtax 
in the fiscally strong state. In our simulation the surtax lines of both states intersect if   g = 1.700. In 
this case, in the fiscally weak state about 56% and in the fiscally strong state about 46% of primary 
expenditures ( g/ g i) are determined by minimum standards.  
   16
Figure 1: Surtaxes in fiscally weak and fiscally strong states with alternative assumptions on the 



















































Source: Calculations by the author. 
 
We also note the following property: If both countries are of the same size, mu = mh and fixed cost are 
identical, au = ah,  the critical level of  g , where the surtax lines of the fiscally weak and strong states 
intersect, is independent of the income difference between both states! Tedious algebra reveals that 
this critical level is given by 
m
a
t s y b g
d c
− + = ) ( . Thus fiscally weak states always have a higher 
surtax as compared to fiscally strong states if  g > 
c
g under the above mentioned conditions. In 
addition, we see that the "critical level" of minimum standards is decreasing in taxing autonomy 
(measured in our interpretation in terms of a smaller value of s) as well as in fixed cost. 
 
In a second simulation experiment we examine the impact of fixed cost on public good provision 
between both states. We assume the same parameters as above and take  g = 1.700, which we 
identified in figure 1 as the critical value of per capita minimum standards where the surtax lines of 
both states intersect and thus both states have an identical tax rate. Next we vary au in the fiscally 
weak state keeping ah in the fiscally strong state constant. The results are shown in figure 2 and 
indicate that an increase in fixed cost puts upward pressure on surtaxes. This issue is of significant 
importance for the current debate on introducing taxing autonomy at the state level in Germany. In 
Germany states with a far above average fiscal burden of the past - as for example above average 
interest payments - argue that the "starting conditions" for entering a regime of taxing autonomy are 
rather heterogeneous and force states with above average inherited fixed costs to collect higher 
surtaxes which creates a significant disadvantage in the tax competition process that will result under   17
taxing autonomy. Our results from the theoretical investigation as well as our simulation experiments 
suggest that this issue is indeed of significant importance. 
 
Figure 2: Surtaxes in fiscally weak and fiscally strong states assuming  g  = 1.700 in both states with a 












0 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200













0 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200




Source: Calculations by the author. 
 
 
Summarizing and discussing the relevance of  the results 
 
Our theoretical investigation as well as our simulation experiments stress the importance of minimum 
standards and the inherited public burden, such as public debt, if a federal system changes from a "no 
tax autonomy regime" to a "tax autonomy regime". The arguments put forward support the conclusion 
drawn by Jourmard and Kongsrud (2003, p. 188), that jurisdictions with a poor taxing capacity might 
find it hard to secure a minimum or average standard of public goods supply in a tax autonomy 
regime. As a matter of course, the strong impact of minimum standards does not come as a surprise. 
Models that disregard minimum standards implicitly assume a virtually perfect upward and downward 
flexibility of public service provision which is by no means realistic. In virtually all policy areas, 
governments have to provide a minimum level of public services.
29  
 
Minimum standards have many reasons. There are Constitutional and legal restrictions (such as in the 
area of environmental protection measures), social and political norms, as well as in the political 
competition between parties that promise to increase the number of policemen or the number of 
teachers in schools etc in election campaigns. As a matter of course, neither in Germany nor in any 
                                                 
29 Ensuring minimum standards in the provision of public services provides a key motivation for fiscal 
equalization systems in federal states.    18
other country, there are legally binding rules for a minimum number of policemen per 100,000 
inhabitants or the number of school teachers per 100 pupils. However, every government that tries to 
reduce public service provision below some minimum benchmark values in areas of political 
sensitivity - such as in the police force or in schools - will face very stiff competition both in 
parliament as well as in the media or even on the street. This pressure holds for both fiscally strong as 
well as fiscally weak states in Germany. One can assume similar conditions in many other (at least 
European) countries. As a matter of course, there are other instruments at hand to respond to high 
minimum standards, as for example wages of public servants. Indeed, in Germany recent reforms 
increased the discretion of states on pay determination in the public sector. However, taking into 
account the strong power of trade unions the effective room for maneuver of state governments gained 
by these reforms is rather small. Consequently, there is significant pressure on fiscally weak states to 
keep up with fiscally strong states in the provision of public services because of the political pressure 




III. Empirical facts 
 
Our theoretical model has three important ingredients that we tailored to the institutional settings in 
Germany: The fiscal equalization system, state fixed cost and minimum standards. In this section we 
present empirical evidence on the importance of these factors.  
 
 
Distributional effects of introducing taxing autonomy at the state level 
 
We use the fiscal equalization system in 2007 to examine the distributional impact of introducing 
taxing autonomy at the state level disregarding all medium- and long-run effects that might result out 
of tax competition between German states.
30 Therefore our results depict short-and medium-run 
effects. 
 
 In  a  first step we reduce the federal income tax rate such, that income tax revenues that accrue 
to the state level are reduced by 10%.  
 In  a  second step states impose surtaxes on the federal income tax collection such that states 
receive the same additional income tax revenues that were lost in the first step because of the reduction 
in the federal income tax rate.  
                                                 
30 See Büttner and Schwager (2003) for similar calculations.   19
 In  a  third step we calculate the distributional impact of step one and step two taking into 
account the fiscal equalization system in Germany assuming that all tax revenues collected in step 2 
are excluded from the fiscal equalization system.  
 
Table 3 reports our results using data and institutional settings in 2007. In the state Nordrhein-
Westfalen the reduction in the federal income tax rate would create a loss of 86 € per capita in step 1 
which is compensated by a surtax on federal income tax payments by the same amount. However, 
Nordrhein-Westfalen is a fiscally strong state and has to make payments in the fiscal equalization 
system which are now significantly reduced because tax revenues collected from the surtax are not 
taken into account in the fiscal equalization system. This results in an increase in total state revenue - 
tax revenue net of fiscal equalization transfers - by about 8 € per capita. For comparison we look at the 
East German state Sachsen. In step one the state Sachsen would lose 33 € per capita which is 
compensated in step two. However, transfer payments of fiscally strong states are reduced because 
revenues collected from the surtax are not taken into account in the fiscal equalization system and 
consequently the state Sachsen would lose a total of 46 € per capita.   
 




 additional  revenues 
from income surtax 
Change in total tax reveues after 
fiscal equalization 
  Mill. €  € per 
capita 
Mill. €  € per capita 
Nordrhein-Wesfalen (NW)  1,548 86 144  8
Bayern (BY)  1,309 105 242  19
Baden-Württemberg (BW)  1,082 101 176  16
Niedersachsen (NI)  554 69 -71  -9
Hessen (HE)  652 107 125  21
Sachsen (SN)  139 33 -193  -46
Rheinland-Pfalz (RP)  311 77 -6  -2
Sachsen-Anhalt (ST)  85 35 -105  -43
Schleswig-Holstein (SH)  217 77 -5  -2
Thüringen (TH)  75 33 -105  -46
Brandenburg (BB)  105 41 -94  -37
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (MV)  54 32 -78  -46
Saarland (SL)  65 62 -17  -16
Berlin (BE)  224 66 -132  -39
Hamburg (HH)  227 129 29  16
Bremen (HB)  53 79 -17  -25
all states  6,700 81 -107  -1
Source: Calculations by the author. 
 
One might wonder, whether these effects are of significant importance in a political discussion. 
However, in the period 2000 - 2001, due to a ruling of the Constitutional Court, the fiscal equalization 
system in Germany had to be reformed and the reform discussion was almost exclusively dominated   20
by distributional issues. The prime ministers of all German states made a decision that the 
distributional effects of reforming the fiscal equalization system in Germany has to stick to 
distributional effects not exceeding the interval of +/- 6 € per capita. Our calculation in table 3 suggest 
distributional effects in the range of -46 € to + 21 € per capita and thus one should expect that any 
discussion on state taxing autonomy in Germany would be severely hampered by distributional effects 
that arise out of this change in policy. 
  
 In  a  final step we calculate the surtax each state would have to apply if all distributional effects 
are neutralized. As can be seen from the last column of table 3, fiscally strong states will have surtaxes 
that are lower than the initial cut in the federal income tax rate whereas the reverse holds true for 
fiscally weak states. Figure 3 reports our results. Whereas fiscally strong states have surtaxes ranging 
from 8.1% to 9.1% the fiscally weak states in West Germany need surtaxes in the range of 10.2% up 
to 13.2%. In the East German states these surtaxes are much higher ranging from 19% to 24.3%. 
 
Figure 3: Surtaxes at the state level in Germany in the year 2007 necessary to achieve distributional 
neutrality
1 
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1 For state abbreviations see table 3.  
Source: Calculations by the author. 
 
As a matter of course, such differences in surtaxes would be impossible to handle politically inside 
and outside Germany. In addition, policy makers in fiscally weak states would not be able to convince 
their citizens that surtaxes have to be larger as compared to surtaxes in fiscally stronger states. 
Consequently, fiscally weak states would not be able to compensate the negative distributional effects 
by an appropriate tax policy and would therefore have to reduce the provision of public services. 
Because the latter is almost as difficult to achieve in the political process as the setting of an above-
average tax rate, it is not surprising that there is stiff opposition of politicians from fiscally weak states 
against taxing autonomy at the state level in Germany. 
 
   21
The fiscal burden of the past at the state level in Germany 
 
Apart from minimum standards the fixed cost parameter ai played a crucial role in the theoretical 
model. We interpreted fixed costs in terms of interest payments and pensions for retired public 
servants. Both expenditures are due to decision made in the past and are hard to manipulate by policy 
makers at least in the short- and medium run. In table 4 we show the fiscal burden associated with 
these two expenditure items and for comparison we also report transfers made and subsidies received 
in the fiscal equalization system.  
 
Table 4: Per capita expenditures on interest payments and pensions for retired public servants as well 
as per capita transfers provided (-) and received (+) in the fiscal equalization system in 2007
1 
 
  Per capita expenditures on 
interest payments and 
pensions for retired public 
servants 
Per capita transfers provided 
(-) and received by states in 
the fiscal equalization system 
including VAT redistribution 
West German area states 
Hessen (HE)  511 -644
Baden-Württemberg (BW)  441 -359
Bayern (BY)  332 -336
Nordrhein-Westfalen (NW)  512 -158
Niedersachsen (NI)  532 78
Schleswig-Holstein (SH)  603 -5
Rheinland-Pfalz (RP)  520 28
Saarland (SL)  738 225
East German states  
Sachsen-Anhalt (ST)  569 776
Brandenburg (BB)  500 749
Sachsen (SN)  307 843
Thüringen (TH)  493 885
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (MV)  465 922
City states  
Hamburg (HH)  1.078 -363
Bremen (HB)  1.371 553
Berlin (BE)  1.130 933
1  In the East German states as well as Berlin special pension payments that are due to inherited pension 
obligations from the former GDR (AAÜG) are included. 
Source: Calculations by the author. 
 
In comparing data for the East and West German states one has to take into account that due to the 
short history of the East German states, figures for the East and West German states are not 
comparable. If we look at the West German area states we note that per capita spending on interest 
payments and pensions for retired public servants in fiscally weak states significantly exceed 
expenditures in fiscally strong states. Whereas fiscally weak states in West Germany have per capita 
spending of about 600 € in the fiscally strong states these expenditures amount to only about 450 €. 
This evidence supports our assumptions made in the theoretical part, namely that fiscally weak states 
have systematically higher per capita fixed costs as compared to fiscally strong states. The bulk of   22
these differences in per capita expenditures are caused by interest payments whereas per capita 
expenditures on pension payments for retired public servants are rather similar within West German 
and within East German states.  
 
In figure 4 we depict the annual increase in per capita public debt in the West German
31 fiscally strong 
and fiscally weak states.
32 In the period 1980 - 2007 the increase in per capita public debt in fiscally 
weak states was on the average about 50% larger as compared to the fiscally strong states. As we 
argued elsewhere, see Seitz (2008a), the above average per capita debt might be due to political 
disincentives that provoke policy makers in fiscally weak states to mimic public service provision in 
the fiscally strong states despite lower per capita revenues.  
 
Figure 4: Annual increase in per capita debt of fiscally weak and fiscally strong states in Germany 

















Source: Calculated from data supplied by the Federal Statistical Office, Wiesbaden, Germany. 
 
A rough estimate of the importance of minimum standard spending 
 
There is no data available from which we can derive empirical evidence on the importance of 
minimum standards at the state level in Germany directly. However, we tried to derive a rough 
estimate of minimum standard spending using data on West German states for the year 2005.
33 To 
achieve this, we calculated the average per capita expenditures as well as the minimum per capita 
expenditures in the West German states in each function. This procedure we carried out both at the 
state level as well as at the aggregate of the state and local government sector in each state. The latter 
calculations have been done because the division of tasks between the state and local government level 
                                                 
31 Excluding the city state Hamburg.  
32 Excluding the city state Bremen as well as the state Saarland because both states received considerable bailout 
transfers in the period 1994 - 2004. 
33 Because the East German states have a quite different per capita spending level as well as expenditure 
structure because of the still ongoing adjustment process in East Germany, we refrained from using East German 
data.   23
varies significantly across states. Because each state has to provide compulsory transfers to the local 
government sector, fixed in the Constitution of each state, which depend upon the fiscal capacity of 
the state and the local government sector as well as the division of tasks between both levels of 
government, for state governments it does not matter whether minimum standards have to be met at 
the state or at the local government sector because state government have to pay for it directly - own 
expenditures - or indirectly - by providing transfers to local governments.  
 
Table 5: Estimate of the importance of minimum per capita spending in Germany in 2005 




















(1a) (2a) (3a) (1b) (2b)  (3b) 
1 General  administration 144 65% 94 351 80%  281
2 tax  administration  92 90% 83 135 92%  124
3  Public order & safety  200 92% 184 299  93%  278
4 Jurisdiction  &  prisons  174 75% 130 174 86%  150
5 Schools  654 90% 589 813 89%  723
7 Universities  310 76% 236 310 76%  236
8  Financial support to 
students 
47 20% 9 69 20%  14
9  All other education   21 49% 10 29  66%  19
10 Research  44 62% 27 48  75%  36
11 Culture    58 32% 19 124  69%  85
12 Social  Welfare
1 441 90% 344 1.097  90%  856
13 Health/environmental 
protection 
98 60% 59 198 81%  160
14  Housing & community 
amenities 
78 68% 53 346 68%  235
15  Agriculture & forestry  67 46% 31 70  45%  31
16  Fuel & energy & water  118 71% 84 144  64%  92
17 Transport  217 78% 169 322  81%  261
18 Economic  activities  83 21% 17 146  32%  47
19 Other  expenditures  90 0% 0 152  0%  0
1-19 total  "primary" 
expenditures 
2.936 75%
2 2.191 4.825 78%
2 3.759
 
20 unconditional  transfers 
to other levels of 
government 
465 - -  -10  -  - 
21  Pensions for retired 
public servants 
368 - -  441  -  - 
22 Interest  payments  338 -  -  416 -  - 
20-22 total  "fixed" 
expenditures 
1,170 - -  846  -  - 
 
1-22 total  expenditures  4.107 -  -  5.671  -  - 
1 In the function "Social Welfare" the bulk of per capita spending differences across states is due to different 
ratios of social welfare recipients in relation to the total population. Therefore we set this ratio equal to 90%,  
2 Calculated by dividing total minimum per capita expenditures by total average expenditures.   24
 
In table 5 we present our results. In the lower part of the table we report three types of expenditures 
that are excluded from our analysis: interest payments (row 22), spending for retired public servants 
(row 21) and spending on interjurisdictional unconditional transfers to the local government sector 
(20). These three expenditure components roughly coincide with our fixed cost parameter ai in our 
theoretical model. In the upper part of the table we report spending in 19 functions which we take into 
account in deriving an estimate of minimum standards. Column (1a) indicates average per capita 
spending across the eight West German area states and column (1b) presents the corresponding figure 
for the aggregate state and local government sector. Column (2a) reports the lowest per capita 
spending in the West German states in percent of the average per capita spending. Column (3a) shows 
the lowest per capita spending in the West German states.
34 The columns (2b) and (3b) report the 
corresponding figures for the aggregate state and local government sector.  
 
In the function tax collection, public order and safety (esp. police), schools as well as social welfare, 
virtually uniform per capita spending are observed and minimum per capita expenditures are 90% and 
above of average per capita spending. Only a few and rather unimportant functions yield estimates of 
minimum expenditures of less than 50% of average spending. In the line reporting the total of 
functions 1 - 19 we get an estimate of the average minimum primary spending ratio of about 75% at 
the state level and of about 78% at the aggregate of the state and local government sector. These 
estimates correspond to the ratio  g / gi  in our theoretical model. Because fiscally weak states have 
lower average per capita spending as fiscally strong states, this ratio is higher in fiscally weak as in 
fiscally strong states.  Thus minimum standard spending is of quite significant importance in Germany 
and in other countries too. 
 
As a matter of course, we are well aware of the fact that our estimates reported in table 5 are rather 
rough and we would need a careful econometric investigation that takes control variables in each 
spending function into account. However, this is far beyond the scope of the present paper. 
Nevertheless, we believe that the data in table 5 provides us at least with a "feeling" of the relative 
importance of per capita minimum spending and the average estimates derived across all functions 
should not be that dramatically different from results that might be derived by using much more 
sophisticated approaches. As a matter of course, high minimum spending might well reflect 
governance problems in Germany. However, these problems are not swept away by introducing taxing 
autonomy at the state level and thus a careful modeling should take these restriction serious if the 
analysis seeks to derive credible policy conclusions.  
 
                                                 
34 That means column (3a) is derived by multiplying the entries in column (1a) and (2a).    25
Summarizing the empirical evidence 
 
In the empirical section we presented evidence on the distributional effects of introducing taxing 
autonomy at the state level assuming a cut in the federal income tax bill and a compensation of the 
foregone state tax revenues by introducing a state surtax on the federal income tax. We showed that 
the distributional impact of this policy is quite significant and results in rather large distributional 
effects at the expense of fiscally weak states. However, these calculations disregarded all potential 
counter effects that might be induced in the long-run by mechanisms at work under a regime of tax 
autonomy. In the theoretical part of the paper we argued that one should assume that the impact of tax 
competition between states is of rather limited quantitative importance. This property should hold at 
least in the short- and medium-run. Even if there would be counterbalancing effects of tax competition 
in the long-run, the question arises if politics would be able to handle the transition process which 
would take a rather long period of times, perhaps even several decades. We also showed that in 
Germany fiscally poorer states carry a significantly higher per capita fixed costs. In addition we 
presented a rather simple and rough estimate of the importance of spending on minimum standards. 
Our results suggest that on the average more than 70% of state spending - net of fixed cost - might be 
absorbed by meeting minimum standards. These results suggest, that minimum standards are of quite 





Using a quite simple theoretical model we examined the question how fiscally weak and fiscally 
strong subnational governments - taking the institutional setting of the German states as a laboratory - 
might respond to the introduction of taxing autonomy. In our model differences in the taxing capacity 
of states as well as differences in fixed costs have been taken into account and in addition, we 
incorporated minimum standards for the provision of public services. The theoretical model did not 
yield clear-cut answers to the question whether fiscally strong or fiscally weak states will collect 
higher surtaxes on federal income taxes. However, both fixed costs and especially minimum standards 
result in a significant bias towards the forecast, that fiscally weaker states will have to set higher 
surtaxes. The empirical part presented evidence on the quantitative importance of fixed cost as well as 
spending on minimum standards. In addition, we derived evidence on the distributional impact of the 
introduction of taxing autonomy for German states taking the effects on the fiscal equalization system 
into account. 
 
We have to admit that the paper has some shortcomings that should be addressed in future research. In 
the theoretical part of the paper we simply assumed the effects that tax competition might have on the   26
interregional distribution of the population as well as the average income away. This we justified by 
arguing that empirical research indicates that differences in taxation does not induce that much 
interregional migration of households within nations. Households are severely hampered in migration 
by the availability of jobs, the closeness to friends and families as well as social and cultural ties. As a 
matter of course, one should expect that in the long-run the relative importance of these factors lose 
importance and thus our analysis should be looked upon as investigating the short- and medium-run. 
The estimate derived on the importance of spending on minimum standards in the empirical also needs 
further refinement.  
 
Our results on the effects of introducing taxing autonomy at the state level are rather critical with 
respect to the effects of such a switch in regime in Germany. Taking our arguments and evidence 
seriously would mean that there is a high probability that fiscal disparities increase in Germany across 
states because fiscally weak states - especially the East German states having a fiscal capacity of less 
than 50% of the West German average - might be negatively affected by distributional effects resulting 
out of differences in surtaxes and the fiscal equalization system. In addition, because the German 
Constitution asks policy makers at the state and national level to strive "for equal living conditions", 
politics as well as the public opinion in Germany is rather sensitive to distributional effects. 
Economists have to take this factor into account if they want to be taken seriously as policy advisors!  
 
As a matter of course, despite the critical results, introducing taxing autonomy at the state level and 
letting tax competition work is by no means a no-policy-option in Germany. However, politics would 
have to introduce some quite significant changes. The most important change would be a change in 
mind with respect to the political focus on regional distribution in Germany. This might make it even 
necessary to change the Constitution and get rid of the Constitutional command for striving for equal 
living conditions. However, at least currently such steps can hardly be imagined. It would be hard for 
policy makers in Germany to explain to the public that politics at the EU level fight for tax 
harmonization and tax policy coordination and at the same time introduce taxation heterogeneity at 
home.  In addition, introducing taxing autonomy at the state level in Germany should go hand in hand 
with the introduction of tough debt restrictions at the state level in Germany, such as in most of the 
Swiss Cantons or U.S. states. Currently, especially fiscally weak states use debt financing intensively 
and state government debt in Germany exploded in the last 15 years. Without stiff debt restrictions 
policy makers would be tempted to issue new public debt instead of using the tax instrument to 
finance additional public services.  
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